A model of humanoid beings

Definitions:

atom of subjective identity	a Cartesian soul. So named, because: (A) it refers to the phenomenon of first person perspective identity (subjective identity), as opposed to third person perspective identity (objective identity); and (B) it is atomic, in the sense that it is indivisible, and has no inherent properties, other than its binding. (Any property it has, other than: (1) being the token it is, (2) being of the type it is of, and (3) being bound as it is bound, is a derivative property of properties (1)-(3).)
experience stream	a region of Q-space. Note that qualia does not only include our external senses, but also our internal ones. Our private thoughts, our dreams, our emotions, are as much qualia as any external sense is.
binding	the fact that every Cartesian soul corresponds to a Q-space region
consistency criteria	the fact that, in order for a Cartesian soul to be bound to a Q-space region, the Q-space region must possess particular properties. These are both the basic geometric constraints of Q-space, as previously discussed; and also, certain further constraints, best demonstrated through (1) the pasting argument, (2) the random selection argument, and (3) the excessive order argument.

Pasting arguments

Suppose Alice and Bob are two distinct persons, who in no way overlap. (Suppose Alice walks into an exact matter duplication machine, which then produces Alice-1 and Alice-2. Alice-1, Alice-2, and original Alice are all persons who in some way overlap, and the question of their distinction or identity is complex. Whereas, for Alice and Bob, there are no such complexities in their distinction, thus we say they in no way overlap.)

Now, let us consider universe 1. In universe 1, Alice and Bob exist. And, in universe 1, Alice and Bob each have an experience stream (= region in Q-space), and let us call these streams Alice-stream and Bob-stream, respectively. Now, these streams are distinct, in such a way that there is no time t such that at time t, the two streams are totally overlapping in non-temporal dimensions.

Now, let us construct universe 2 as follows: choose an arbitrary time t, such that both Alice-stream and Bob-stream exist at time t. Now, let us construct two new streams, Alice-prime-stream and Bob-prime-stream, as follows:

Before time t:

Alice-prime-stream = Alice-stream

Bob-prime-stream = Bob-stream

After time t:

Alice-prime-stream = Bob-stream

Bob-prime-stream = Alice-stream

Let us refer to universe 2 as a pasting of universe 1. In other words, to get universe 2, we have cut the experience streams of universe 1, and then pasted them together again, in some improper manner, to produce universe 2.

Thesis:

A Cartesian soul can be bound to Alice-stream, and a Cartesian soul can be bound to Bob-stream. But no Cartesian soul can be bound to Alice-prime-stream, and nor can any Cartesian soul be bound to Bob-prime-stream.

Intuitively, this thesis appears to be true. Why would it be true? It would be true, if, in order to be bound to a Cartesian soul (= subjective identity atom), a region of Q-space must obey certain criteria, connected to its internal consistency, or equivalent continuity (= it must exhibit macroscale continuity, even if that is reducible to microscale discreteness).

The random selection argument

Consider the set of all possible Q-space regions. Now, select a random region. It seems, with extraordinarily high probability (if not even, almost surely), that the region has no discernable structure; that it is utterly random; that it is indistinguishable from white noise. Now, the following thesis seems intuitively true:

Thesis:

A Cartesian soul cannot be bound to a Q-space region of excessive noise.

Suppose, we could devise some metric n, which measures the noise of a region of Q-space. We might equivalently state, that there is some upper bound to n, such that no Cartesian soul can be bound to a region whose noise is above that bound.

The excessive order argument

The random selection argument, seeks to show that an atom cannot bind to a Q-space with excessive noise. But, consider instead a Q-space which has almost no noise. Consider, for instance, the region of an n-plane in Q-space. As much as a soul cannot bind to noise, it seems that a soul cannot bind to an n-plane either. For in the first case, there is too much noise; in the second, too little.

If a soul was bound to an n-plane, it only have one single experience, repeated continuously throughout the totality of its existence. And yet, it seems, that a single repeated experience, is identical to there being a single unit of time, which is identical to the utter absence of any temporality.

Thesis:

A Cartesian soul cannot be bound to a Q-space region of insufficient noise.

Can the consistency criteria be known exactly?

I would suggest, that any attempt to discover the consistency criteria with exactitude, will fall victim to some parallel to Gödel’s theorems. If the universe is finite, then I would suggest that the information contained in the consistency criteria is greater than or equal to the total information content of the universe. Thus, in its precise form, it is in essence unknowable, or if knowable at all, only through some ineffable, mystical, Zen-like form of knowledge.

If this is true, then there are two possibilities:

1. The precise form of the consistency criteria exists, but is unknowable.
2. There is no precise form of the consistency criteria.

It would seem, that these two possibilities are in fact indistinguishable and absolutely equivalent and identical.