Sorites and humanoid intelligences

In my various musings, I have made significant use of the notions of "humanoid being" and "Earth-like planet", which I have argued are essentially connected notions. (Humanoid beings can only exist on Earth-like planets -- it may be objected that they can also exist on spaceships or space colonies; but, the essence of the idea of Earth-like planet is that involves certain types of sensations and a certain order of magnitude of volume of sensation -- thus, the term "Earth-like planets" should be taken to include human settlements in space or on non-Earth-like planets.)

Now, I realise this falls victim to Sorites paradox. For example, I claim that humanoid beings can only have a finite and bounded intelligence. And yet, I cannot name any such bound, and it would seem, by Sorites paradox, no such bound exists.

Consider the case, in which beings exist with ever increasing intelligence, without limit. This is a scenario which falls victim Sorites paradox -- suppose I try to fix some limit b, such that a being is humanoid if its intelligence is less than b. But if there exist beings with both slightly more and slightly less intelligence than b, one could claim my choice of limit is arbitrary. And if the intelligence distribution was sufficiently smooth, one could claim that any such choice I might make would be arbitrary.

Suppose, on the contrary, that only a finite number of beings exist, have ever existed and ever will exist. Then, there must be (or have been) a being such that no being has, ever has had or ever will have a greater intelligence. Now, is this being humanoid? Suppose the answer is yes -- is then the notion of humanoid being precisely definable? One should say, that a humanoid being is any being with intelligence no greater than that of the greatest ever intelligence. One might object, that a purely hypothetical being with even greater intelligence might still, if it existed, be justifiably called humanoid; and yet, it would seem, that to entertain such an objection would be rather pointless; it is one thing to ask whether our concepts can be applied to beings whom we do not know to exist, but then again we do not know that they do not or might not either; but, when it has been established as a matter of fact (in this case, by assumption) that no such being ever has or ever will exist, the question then seems pointless to answer or entertain.

I would assert that either (1) every being which exists is humanoid; or (2) there exist a finite number of beings, some of which are humanoid and some of which are not. Now, in the latter case, we may still encounter Sorites around humanoid beings; but since, the main point of invoking the notion of humanoid beings was to prove their finitude, if that was established then the continued maintenance of the concept might not be so necessary.