Consider all chairs. They seem to all have some property in common, that of being a chair. How do we explain this property? A universalist might say, there exists a concept, form, idea, of chairness, which exists independently of any individual chair, which all the individual chairs participate in. A nominalist, by contrast, would claim that "chairness" has no real existence; "chair" is nothing more than a label, which we choose to apply to certain things; ultimately, all they have in common is the fact that we choose the same label to refer to them.
Let us suppose we agree with the nominalist. But then let us turn to an individual chair. Much as chairs are individuals, which are claimed to participate in a universal, so we might observe that each individual chair is in fact a compound object - it is compounded temporally of temporal parts; it is compounded spatially of different physical subcomponents; as an experience, it is compounded of different qualia. And it is claimed that these various subcomponents, these various qualia, participate in the individual. How is this relationship of participation of the subcomponents or qualia in the individual different from the participation of the individual in the universal? So, if we agree with the nominalist that the later participation is merely nominal, should we not also hold that the former participation is equally nominal? So it seems, that when we believe in the existence of a chair, we are as deluded as when we believe in the existence of a universal of chairness.
An argument that a Q-space account is more fundamental than a P-space account: Consider a chair. Does the chair have a clear boundary with the air? Experientally it seems it does. And, in terms of a Q-space account, it certainly does, since Q-space is no finer than the limits of our perception. And yet, P-space is far finer than the limits of our perception; thus, we can ask, what is the boundary of the chair, in terms of molecules, or atoms, subatomic particles, etc? And it seems, that later question is impossible to answer with exact certainty at the boundary. Which suggests, that a Q-space description of a chair is more natural, and hence more fundamental, than a P-space description, which suggests that Q-space is more fundamental than P-space.
Derek Parfit writes (p.281 of Reasons and Persons):
Is this truth [of reductionism] depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and consoling. When I believed that my existence was a such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.
Even though, I do not share Parfit’s reductionism, I think this passage is intriguing because it acknowledges that the question of personal identity, even when approached from the most abstract, rational, secular perspective, is always an issue of great personal, psychological, even spiritual import, whatever conclusions we may draw. I suppose it should not be surprising that personal identity is personal.
To what extent can Parfit’s views be seen to parallel the Buddhist doctrine of anatta / anatman? Has Parfit attained nirvana?
Questions about Buddhism:
—Suppose there is karma and samsara. Now, let us suppose atman was true. I should be concerned about my next life, because it will be me who suffers or benefits in it. Then, suppose atman is false. Then, why should I be concerned about the next life, since if there is no common self which exists across lives, then it is not me who suffers or benefits, but some other person whom my deeds or cravings caused to exist — why should I care for them?
—Suppose there is karma and samsara. Now, let us suppose atman is true, and furthermore the atman incapable of any merger or division, and can occupy but one body at a time. Hence, after each death, there can only be one immediately subsequent rebirth, and before each birth, there can only be one immediately subsequent death. But, suppose on the contrary, anatman, and the bundle theory (of skandhas) often associated with it are true. Now, in the later case, why should I assume that one bundle gives rise to only one immediately subsequent bundle, or that one bundle is only given rise to by one immediately preceding bundle? Would it not be equally possible, for I to have multiple immediately subsequent lives, or for I to have multiple immediately preceding lives? Might not the bundle elements simply return to the All, only to be taken out of it again, in some essentially random configuration, such that I could have no reason to think I am the successor of any preceding person any more than any other, or that any future person will be any more or less my successor than any other? But if this is the case, I should not be concerned by karma.
Nick Bostrom writes (in Are you living in a computer simulation?):
Further rumination on these themes could climax in a naturalistic theogony that would study the structure of this hierarchy, and the constraints imposed on its inhabitants by the possibility that their actions on their own level may affect the treatment they receive from dwellers of deeper levels. For example, if nobody can be sure that they are at the basement-level, then everybody would have to consider the possibility that their actions will be rewarded or punished, based perhaps on moral criteria, by their simulators. An afterlife would be a real possibility. Because of this fundamental uncertainty, even the basement civilization may have a reason to behave ethically. The fact that it has such a reason for moral behavior would of course add to everybody else’s reason for behaving morally, and so on, in truly virtuous circle. One might get a kind of universal ethical imperative, which it would be in everybody’s self-interest to obey, as it were “from nowhere”.
Let us suppose that we are living in a computer simulation. Let us furthermore suppose, that our simulators have simulated us to fulfil some petty desire of theirs (e.g. I want to be a Hollywood movie star), and that all the horrors of human history (wars, holocausts, etc.) have been accurately simulated, so that the authenticity of the fulfilment of the petty desire can be better guaranteed. Having done so, let us say our simulators feel some twang of guilt (And all time past, was it all for this?, to quote Swinburne), and wish to justify to themselves their behaviour by saying: “Well, let us at the end give them the same opportunity that we have; let us even assume, the same opportunity as we had, for as surely as there are those beneath us, there must also be others above us, who have treated us in the very same way; we cannot give up our desires — for without desire fulfilment, what is the point of existence? — but, if there is no ”
One day you are walking down the street, and you see a man hitting his girlfriend. You try to intervene, and he pulls out a gun and shoots you dead. The media lauds you as a noble good Samaritan, innocent victim, etc.; but, nevertheless, you are dead.
You awake from after the bullet wound. A being appears before you and says: I am a representative of the beings who created your world; you have lived your life, in order that their desires might be fulfilled through the existence of your world and all that is within it; how your life fulfilled those desires, however large or small a role it had in their fulfilment, is irrelevant. But, having so been used, it is only right that we atone by giving you the power to use others as we ourselves have used you. What, then, do you wish for?
What might you answer? Maybe, for a world in which you were not gunned down trying to save a total stranger. And, maybe, you might wish: I want a world in which the man who shot me has the worst life he possibly could.
So it seems, that some variation of Bostrom’s naturalistic theogony can result in a phenomenon not dissimilar to Karma.
Another question:
—If Karma is a theory of causation, must we assume that it is temporal? Suppose the universe is temporally finite and unbounded, and thus that time is cyclic. Then every world line is a closed time-like curve. If that was so, there would be no reason to assume that only the past can cause the future; so long as we allow indirect causation, there is seemingly no reason why the future cannot cause the past, and thus the Karmic consequences of an action might not be reaped before or after or simultaneously with the action itself. And, if every world-line is a CTC, might it be the case that not every such world-line has maximal circumference? In which case, we can make time-reversed causation as direct as we’d like, by making the circumference as small as we’d like.
The branch line case is seen by many as terminal for Cartesianism. If we assume that there is, at any one time, a one-to-one correspondence between bodies and souls, then either one, the other, or neither of the succeeding lines can still possess the same soul as the anterior line. And yet, neither of these three choices seems satisfactory. Thus, it is argued, Cartesianism must fail. But, suppose we deny the claim of one-to-one-correspondence. I might then analyse a branch-line case in my future as follows. Right now, I have two souls, which are absolutely identical, except that, when the branch-line occurs in my future, one soul will follow one line the other the other; the point of branching is the time at which they become distinct.
As much as I might branch, might I not also come together? At the moment, we experience our first-hand experiences first-hand; whereas we experience the first-hand experiences of others only third-hand. But suppose you and I were joined in such a way, that whatever you saw I saw, whatever you felt I felt, whatever you thought I thought, etc. Would we not, quickly, become unable to tell ourselves apart? Would we not then, cease to be two different persons, but have merged together as one? Or, to give a more Cartesian reading, just as in the branch-line case two previously identical souls have become distinct, so in the merger case two previously distinct souls have become identical.
Parfit feels liberated from the glass tunnel by his reductionism. And yet suppose the glass was real, not merely illusory — am I then condemned to live within it, as long as I live, or else forever? What if the branch line, and the merger line, were not merely philosophical gedanken, or rare actual occurrence, but the reality in the lives of all of us? What if we had one single predecessor, of which we are all branch lines? What if we have one single successor, which is of us all a merger? Indeed, if we had one single ultimate predecessor and one single ultimate successor, might it not be that the two were in fact one and the same, in one great cycle of time? And if we were to give a Cartesian reading to such a chain of events, might we not conclude that the glass wall is but a temporary phenomenon; the wall is broken in branching and merging; and, in the beginning and the end, then many walls reduce to one wall, which encompasses all that is. Thus, to be liberated from our glass walls, we do not have to pretend not to see them.
What is the point of anatta? To escape the glass wall?
We can consider two models of the Cartesian soul. One, a fuller model, in which the soul is the person, and it has all the properties which can be ascribed to a person — likes, dislikes, loves, hates, desires, beliefs, a name, a history; etc. — and a simple model, in which the souls has no properties other than being exposed to a particular qualia stream; anything we might ascribe to a person is reducible to certain qualia in the qualia stream, either of that person or of some other; a reductionism, not of psychological states to physical states, but rather a reductionism of both psychological and physical states to qualia. Is the point of anatta, to deny the fuller model, to deny the permanence of these myriad attributes? For if that is the intention, then the simpler model equal denies the myriad attributes; they are but the ephemera of qualia; they come and go as the qualia change. And, if the branching and merging of all be true, then they change from and to something which cannot be identified with the person of the fuller model, even if it remains the atom of subjective identity, bound to a Q-space region, which the simpler model assumes.
In my various musings, I have made significant use of the notions of "humanoid being" and "Earth-like planet", which I have argued are essentially connected notions. (Humanoid beings can only exist on Earth-like planets -- it may be objected that they can also exist on spaceships or space colonies; but, the essence of the idea of Earth-like planet is that involves certain types of sensations and a certain order of magnitude of volume of sensation -- thus, the term "Earth-like planets" should be taken to include human settlements in space or on non-Earth-like planets.)
Now, I realise this falls victim to Sorites paradox. For example, I claim that humanoid beings can only have a finite and bounded intelligence. And yet, I cannot name any such bound, and it would seem, by Sorites paradox, no such bound exists.
Consider the case, in which beings exist with ever increasing intelligence, without limit. This is a scenario which falls victim Sorites paradox -- suppose I try to fix some limit b, such that a being is humanoid if its intelligence is less than b. But if there exist beings with both slightly more and slightly less intelligence than b, one could claim my choice of limit is arbitrary. And if the intelligence distribution was sufficiently smooth, one could claim that any such choice I might make would be arbitrary.
Suppose, on the contrary, that only a finite number of beings exist, have ever existed and ever will exist. Then, there must be (or have been) a being such that no being has, ever has had or ever will have a greater intelligence. Now, is this being humanoid? Suppose the answer is yes -- is then the notion of humanoid being precisely definable? One should say, that a humanoid being is any being with intelligence no greater than that of the greatest ever intelligence. One might object, that a purely hypothetical being with even greater intelligence might still, if it existed, be justifiably called humanoid; and yet, it would seem, that to entertain such an objection would be rather pointless; it is one thing to ask whether our concepts can be applied to beings whom we do not know to exist, but then again we do not know that they do not or might not either; but, when it has been established as a matter of fact (in this case, by assumption) that no such being ever has or ever will exist, the question then seems pointless to answer or entertain.
I would assert that either (1) every being which exists is humanoid; or (2) there exist a finite number of beings, some of which are humanoid and some of which are not. Now, in the latter case, we may still encounter Sorites around humanoid beings; but since, the main point of invoking the notion of humanoid beings was to prove their finitude, if that was established then the continued maintenance of the concept might not be so necessary.
As I understand it, one of the points of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons is that questions of rationality and personality identity are intimately connected.
People will frequently give up immediate benefits for their present self in favour of a greater benefit for some future self, whereas they might not give up the same benefit for their present self in favour of a greater benefit for a present or future other. They treat their future selves with some special consideration which they do not extend to the present selves of others. This special consideration is considered rational, on the grounds that their future self is the same person as their present self. So, this concept of the rationality of self-interest, assumes a concept of personal identity across time.
The problem is — if I have multiple future selves, not temporally subsequent from each other, but rather temporally simultaneous with each other, how do I make sense of the concept of "giving up immediate benefits for my present self in favour of a future benefit for some future self"? What if, a certain course of action, will produce a better outcome for future self A, and a worse outcome for future self B? If I knew that one was such self was uniquely I in a way in which other such selves was not, I would be rationally justified in giving that future self special consideration above the others. But, in the absence of such knowledge, it seems that I am rationally obliged to extend to them all equal consideration.
Let us assume that MWI is true. Then, it seems, that I have an innumerable number of future selves, and that, whatever course of action I might take in the present, there will be future worlds, and hence future selves, in which that course of action has resulted in a positive outcome, and other future worlds in which that course of action has resulted in a negative outcome. So, there does not seem to be any course of action in the present, which can be said to benefit myself in the future; since, whatever I do, there are some future selves who are better, and other future selves that are worse. So, it seems, that rational behaviour is impossible.
The obvious objection is as follows: Act such that the future self whose world has the greatest probability amplitude experiences the most benefit. The problem I see here is, as I have earlier discussed, can we really claim to know the probability amplitudes of other universes? The only way we could know them, is by observation of this world, combined with an assumption that our world is an “average” world — and yet, there are no grounds to justify the assumption that our world is average. (We could say that, average worlds have the highest probability amplitudes; and yet, if we were in a non-average world, by this argument we would still think our world was average — thus, it seems equally epistemically likely that our world is average as it is not.) We should also ask, even if the concept of probability amplitudes can be justified, whether
Now, many minds might not have this problem, since many minds would hold that there are many present selves, which are exactly identical in every way, other than having as their successors differing future selves, those future selves themselves differing from each other in ways other than succession. (Which is not to say that many minds may not have other, different, problems.)
Does modal realism have this problem? Suppose there exists two universes, which are right now exactly identical, and one of which is our universe, but which begin to diverge in a thousand years time. Let us assume both universes are equally real; let us also assume that I only live for a normal human lifespan (thus I will be dead before the universes begin to differ), and let us assume there is no pre-mortal nor post-mortal existence. Therefore, for the entire duration of my life then there is an I in this world, and there is another person in that other world which is exactly like me in every possible way. Now, if we adopt Lewis’ approach to trans-world identity, which states that if two entities belong to different universes they are non-identical, even if their universe membership is the sole property by which they differ, then it follows that there actually exist two people, one of which who is me, and another one who is not me, but is exactly like me, in every possible way, and has always been exactly like me and always will be exactly like me. But, there seems to be no rational reason to claim two entities who are absolutely identical in content are nonetheless distinct, simply because each is distantly related to two distinct future events. It seems more intuitive to claim that there is one single entity, which is doubly related, once each to each of the distinct future different events. Therefore, I would say, we should reject Lewis’ approach to trans-world identity.
But, if we do so, then modal realism does fall victim to this very same issue? Any theory
I think, that for rational behaviour to be possible, the set of our actual futures must be sufficiently smaller than the set of all possible futures. It may be that there is a single actual future from the present; it may be there are several. But so long as there are only a few, it seems we do not have this problem.
Hypothetical scenario: I am homeless, and have been living on the streets for the last twenty years. An extraordinarily rich man appears, who has is famous for giving immense gifts to randomly selected homeless people. He offers me the following choice: $1 million today, or $1 billion in 2 weeks time. Which is it rational for me to accept? Almost everyone would say, all things being equal, that the $1 billion in 2 weeks is better than the $1 million today, and that I would be irrational to prefer the $1 million today. Suppose the world from today has a single unique future. Then, although because I don’t know the future, it could perchance turn out that the $1 million today is the best option (e.g. maybe (an epistemic maybe), whatever I do, the famous rich man will go mad and murder me in one weeks time — better then 1 week of living the good life on $1 million followed by death, then 1 week of continued poverty and homelessness followed by death, all the while waiting patiently to receive $1 billion which in the end will never come), I still feel justified in saying that the $100 million is the better choice.
Now, suppose it is true that every logically conceivable future is an actual future, and there is no reason to consider one future more “real” than another, and I know these facts. Then, it seems, that if I choose A, there exist futures in which C or D follows; and if choose B, there also exist universes in which C or D follows. So, it seems, that based on the universes which actually exist, I have no reason to believe that A causes C over D (or vis-à-vis), or that B causes C over D (or vis-à-vis). Therefore, it seems, preferring D over C, but being neutral in and of themselves as to A and B, that I have no reason therefore to choose one of A or B over the other. Thus, it seems, whatever I desire, that any course of action is as rational as any other, and thus, rational behaviour is impossible.
Suppose I know there are a limited number of actual futures (less than every possible, but more than only one). Would rationality be possible in these circumstances? It would depend, on what assumptions I could make about the choice function which chooses which worlds are actual and which are merely possible.
Let us suppose that Bostrom’s simulation hypothesis is true — suppose that, at a certain point in human history, technology develops to the point that human beings can create highly accurate computer simulations, and that we, rather than being “real” humans, are actually part of one of those computer simulations. Suppose we can assume that the simulators have reasonably similar goals, motivations, desires, etc., to us, and that they have created us to fulfil some desires on their part (e.g. desires for drama, for excitement, for sex, for role-playing, to explore historical what-if scenarios, etc.; the kind of reasons for which we today would create highly accurate computer simulations, if we had the power.) So, we know there are likely multiple future histories, and we don’t know which possible future histories are actual, but we do have at least some idea of the kind of factors which determine which possible future histories are actual and which are not. Our judgement of a certain course of action being rational is based on our holding certain causal theories, and our past observations support those theories. (e.g. (1) this rich man’s behaviour is well known, he has been on TV and in the newspaper, everyone talks about him, etc.; (2) a person, having established a pattern of behaviour, is likely to continue in it.) Our question is, are simulators having these motivations likely to create simulations in which these judgements are valid, or invalid? Or in other words, are simulators having these motivations likely to create simulations in which basic principles of inductive reasoning and reasoning from authority hold, or are so frequently violated as to be impossible to rationally adhere to? It seems, if the simulators are motivated by the factors aforementioned, they are likely to leave the causal structure of the world largely as we would expect, and only violate it on rare occasions, as necessary to achieve their goals; and given that these principles are only expressed as generalities, an occasional violation of a general principle is no violation at all, and thus, it seems the simulators will uphold them. Suppose, by contrast, that modal realism is true instead. Then, we have no reason to believe that the choice of universes which exist, would tend to support belief in inductive principles, since it seems every possible violation of those principles would occur in some future history, and every possible combination of those violations. So it seems, if we know there are multiple actual futures, then rationality is only possible if we can rationally assume that the selection of actual futures out of possible futures occurs in such a way as to encourage rationality.
Now, I have argued that under MWI, it is impossible to derive the probabilities of universes in the multiverse from the probabilities observed within any particular universe, since every possible particular set of probabilities will be observed by someone, and if it justified for any of them to derive multiverse-level probabilities from universe-level probabilities, then it is justified for everyone to make the very same derivation. Thus, we have no reason, based on observation of the probabilities in this universe, to believe that any particular assignment of probabilities in the multiverse is true.
Is the simulation scenario self-defeating in the same way? No. This is because, we have no reason to believe every possible particular set of probabilities will be observed by someone. Since only some possible universes exist, and the choice of which is based on certain motivations, we thus determine the multiverse-level structure. Since the universe-level structure of every universe would be driven by the same motivations, we have good reason to believe that one is a good cue to the other. In other words — if the actual universe determining principle is based on humanoid motivations, we have good reason to believe “as above so below” — i.e. intra-universe distributions are similar to inter-universe distributions. If, on the other hand, the determining principle is based on everything logically possible is, then we have no reason to believe there is any parallel between inter-universe and intra-universe distributions.
[Also relevant here is Bostrom’s general work on observer-dependence, as seen in both the simulation and doomsday arguments. I suppose, with MWI — if X observers actually exist, do we consider it equally likely for us to be any of them, or can we somehow claim that we are more likely to be some of those observers than others (e.g. more likely to be those observers having higher probability amplitudes?)? We might say, well, we observe p. But, all we can conclude from that, is 100% we are in the group of observers who observe p, and 0% that we are in the group of observers who do not. It still doesn’t justify the belief that we are an ‘average’ observer, i.e. one whose local probability measurements give an accurate measure of global probability measurements.]
